




We are often forced to make trade- offs between the well- being of persons who 
will exist independently of what we choose and that of merely possible per-
sons. Such forced trade- offs occur in the contexts of procreation, resource con-
servation, climate change, and public health. For example, should the Global 
Burden of Disease study,1 used for priority setting in public health, take into 
account years of good life lost by never existing, in addition to years of good 
life lost by premature death? Should it, other things equal, give equal weight 
to these two ways of failing to have more years of good life?2 Should reducing 
existential risks, that is, risks of everyone on the planet being destroyed, be a 
top priority?3 A greater priority than fighting global poverty? How we should 
answer these monumentally important practical questions depends in large 
part on whether (and if so, to what extent) we should give priority to independ-
ently existing persons over merely possible persons. In this chapter I  argue 
that the standard basis for deprioritizing merely possible persons— that things 
cannot be better or worse for them— faces serious problems.
1.  Worse for and Worse
Possible states of affairs can be better or worse, from an impartial, or agent- 
neutral, perspective. Suppose that in one possible state of affairs, you enjoy an 
ice cream cone, and, for some unrelated reason and unbeknownst to you, five 
distant people suffer intense pain and die. In a second possible state of affairs, 
things unfold neutrally for you and for these others. All other things are equal. 
1 Murray et al. (2012).
2 See Hutchinson ( chapter 14, this volume) on extending lives versus creating lives.
3 See Bostrom (2013).
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While the first possible state of affairs may be better for you than the second, 
the first possible state of affairs seems all things considered worse than the 
second from an impartial perspective. Or, as I will more simply say, the first 
possible state of affairs seems worse.
Well- being refers to nonderivative goodness for people, and a life’s well- being 
level refers to the quantity of such goodness there is in this life. Intuitively, many 
different sorts of things are capable of contributing positively to well- being: 
pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, moral virtue, and so on. 
Some things seem capable of contributing negatively: pain, and perhaps illness, 
desire frustration, and moral vice too.4 I will refer to a span of life between times 
t1 and t2 with a net positive well- being level as good life.
I understand the death of a person to be the ceasing to exist of this person. 
Suppose Jane accidentally steps out in front of a bus. Jane is struck by the bus 
and dies instantly. If she had not died when she did, she would have had another 
80 years of good life. The nonexistence of a person differs from the death of a 
person in that it is not the ceasing to exist, but the never existing, of a person. 
Suppose that Lucy never actually exists but that if Jill and Jack had had inter-
course at 11:39 p.m. on June 19, 2016, in some highly specific way, Lucy would have 
existed and had 80 years of good life. Jane is an actual person, who died. Lucy is a 
merely possible person, who never actually existed.
Most of us are prepared to say that the possible state of affairs in which Jane 
dies is worse for her than the possible state of affairs in which she has another 
80 years of good life. Is the possible state of affairs in which Lucy never exists 
worse for her than the possible state of affairs in which she has 80 years of good 
life? Some are inclined to answer “yes” and to accept the following:
Comparativism: Possible states of affairs in which person S exists can be 
better or worse for S than possible states of affairs in which S does not exist.5
A simple argument for Comparativism builds from the intuition that those 
who live good lives have reason to be glad they exist rather than not and claims 
the best explanation of this is that existing with good lives is better for them 
than never existing. Such arguments are controversial and have failed to defeat 
incredulous stares from those who deny Comparativism and thereby accept 
4 For an introduction to well- being, see Crisp (2015). According to Hedonism, only pleasure and 
pain contribute (positively and negatively respectively) to well- being; according to Desire Satisfaction 
Views, only desire satisfaction and frustration contribute to well- being; according to Objective List 
Views, many of the various things listed above contribute to well- being independently of whether they 
are pleasurable or desired. I have defined well- being in terms of people merely for convenience; I think 
it is clear that the concept can also apply to sentient non- persons, e.g., to chickens.
5 Proponents of Comparativism include Hare (1975), Roberts (2003), Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 
(2015), and Cusbert and Greaves (2016). In note 29 below, I discuss Limited Comparativism.
 The Worseness of Nonexistence }   217
Non- Comparativism.6 Many are strongly attracted to the thought that, in order 
for a possible state of affairs to be better or worse for S than another, S must 
exist in both possible states of affairs under comparison. As discussed in sec-
tion 6, many find it incoherent to deny Non- Comparativism.
Comparativism and Non- Comparativism are about betterness for (worse-
ness for). There is a family of views that links betterness for (worseness for) 
to betterness (worseness). These are Person- Affecting Views.7 According to a 
Strong Person- Affecting View, if possible state of affairs A  is better (worse) 
than possible state of affairs B, then A is better (worse) for at least one person 
than B.  Suppose we combine this Strong Person- Affecting View with Non- 
Comparativism. Together these views imply that, all else equal, the possible 
state of affairs in which Lucy never exists is not worse than the possible state of 
affairs in which she has 80 years of good life. Non- Comparativism implies that 
the first possible state of affairs is not worse for Lucy, and the Strong Person- 
Affecting View implies that, given that the first possible state of affairs is not 
worse for Lucy, and all else is equal, it is not worse.
Many accept Non- Comparativism but reject the Strong Person- Affecting 
View, allowing that the state of affairs in which Lucy never exists is indeed 
worse than the possible state of affairs in which she has 80 years of good life, 
even though it is not worse for her.8 We could still more modestly maintain a 
Weak Person- Affecting View, according to which there is some special signifi-
cance for the betterness (worseness) of possible states of affairs, of their being 
better (worse) for particular people. There are many possible such views. On 
one such view, the degree to which the state of affairs in which Jane dies is 
worse than the state of affairs in which she has another 80 years of good life is 
greater than the degree to which the state of affairs in which Lucy never exists 
is worse than the state of affairs in which she has 80 years of good life. There 
is a greater degree of worseness in the former case, one might claim, because 
it involves worseness for a particular person, whereas the latter case does not.
Assuming Non- Comparativism, the Strong Person- Affecting View entails 
that it would not be better if there were trillions more very good lives, at no 
expense to those of us who would exist independently, and Weak Person- 
Affecting Views give at least some greater priority to independently exist-
ing persons over merely possible persons. Many deny these claims, arguing 
6 Proponents of Non- Comparativism include Parfit (1984), Broome (1999), Bykvist (2007), and 
Bader (2015b). Bader argues that the intuition that those who live good lives have reason to be glad 
they exist rather than not is easily confused with the intuition that they have reason to be glad they are 
still alive rather than having died much earlier.
7 Narveson (1967) is one of the first to have defended a Person- Affecting View. For more recent 
discussions, see Arrhenius (2003), Roberts (2011), Temkin (2012), Ross (2015), and Bader (2015a).
8 E.g., Parfit (1984); Broome (2004).
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that possible states of affairs are better insofar as they contain more good life, 
regardless of whether this extra good life is better for anyone.
The greater priority given by Person- Affecting Views to independently 
existing persons over merely possible persons hinges on the claim that things 
can be better or worse for the former but not the latter. If Comparativism were 
true, then there would be no such basis for giving less priority to merely pos-
sible persons.9 Though defenders of Person- Affecting Views and their oppo-
nents may still disagree in theory, they could arrive at the same answers to 
many of the monumentally important practical questions noted at the begin-
ning of the chapter.10
In what follows, I will offer a new argument for Comparativism. My argu-
ment builds from assumptions about the metaphysics of persons, to which 
I now turn.
2.  The Metaphysics of Persons
In focusing on the metaphysics of persons, I intend to concentrate on the meta-
physics of what we essentially are, whether or not we are essentially persons. 
Some candidates for what we essentially are include human organism, brain, 
capacity for consciousness, person, nonphysical soul, or some combination of 
these.11 For simplicity, let “person” refer to whatever sort of thing we essentially 
are. Let x refer to a thing (or collection of things) that could be a person, in 
that it would be if it were appropriately modified. A lump of clay, for example, 
would be a statue if it took on the right shape. (It may be more accurate to 
say that an x could constitute a person, but I will carry on with simpler “be” 
language.)
According to Reductionism, whether a thing x is a person is determined 
solely by various other facts, namely whether x possesses various properties, 
such as the properties of being self- aware, being rational, or being a living 
organism. In saying that whether x is a person is determined solely by other 
facts, I mean that the fact of whether x is a person consists wholly in various 
impersonal facts. On Reductionism so understood, we could give a complete 
description of reality without making any reference to persons.12 Reductionism 
seems a defensible metaphysical view.
9 There are further possibly relevant issues concerning whether greater priority should be given to 
identified persons over merely statistical persons (see Hare 2012, 2013).
10 Roberts (2011) is an exception in that she defends Comparativism, and thus agrees that never 
existing can be worse for the never existing, but she claims that this worseness for does not matter mor-
ally. I cannot adequately discuss Roberts’s view here; see Frick (2015) for criticisms.
11 For some competing views about what sort of thing we essentially are, see Thomson (1997), Olson 
(1997), McMahan (2002), and Parfit (2012).
12 See Parfit (1984).
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According to Gradability, we essentially are the sort of thing that an x’s 
being this sort of thing at least in part requires x’s possessing some finely 
gradable property P to a sufficient degree.13 Assuming all other conditions on 
an x’s being a person are met, then whether the x is a person is determined 
solely by whether it possesses P to a sufficient degree. Perhaps in order to be 
a person, a thing must possess or exercise certain psychological capacities to 
a sufficient degree.14 Gradability seems another defensible metaphysical view. 
Reductionism and Gradability together support
Fragility of Existence: In some cases whether x is a person is determined 
solely by whether it possesses property P to a slightly greater degree. The 
nonevaluative difference between the possible state of affairs in which x 
is a person and the possible state of affairs in which x is not a person can 
be slight, when the difference in the degree to which x possesses prop-
erty P is slight.15
One might object that the nonevaluative difference between being a person and 
not cannot be slight. Although normally the nonevaluative difference between 
being a person and not is large, it is slight in many of the cases I explore here, 
as in these cases this difference consists wholly in a slight difference in the 
possession of property P. In these cases, a slight increase in P would not trig-
ger any metaphysical emergence beyond the fact that x is a person (which is 
wholly reducible to impersonal facts, according to Reductionism). Similarly, 
if whether a collection of grains of sand is a heap were sometimes determined 
solely by whether it contains one more grain, this difference between being a 
heap and not would consist wholly in this slight difference in grains.
One might next object that, just as a difference of one grain of sand cannot 
plausibly make the difference between being a heap and not, a slight differ-
ence in property P cannot plausibly make the difference between being a per-
son and not. We might invoke indeterminacy in order to “tolerate” the slight 
former differences without their making the corresponding latter differences. 
I will return to this in section 5.
Barring indeterminacy, Reductionism and Gradability support Fragility of 
Existence. I  cannot here present the arguments for metaphysical views like 
Reductionism and Gradability, which together enable Fragility of Existence. 
But such views seem plausible enough and are taken seriously enough by phi-
losophers16 that it is surely worthwhile investigating what ethical implications 
they might have.
13 Gradability thus seems inconsistent with the view that we are essentially nonphysical souls.
14 Being a human organism or a brain also in part requires possessing finely gradable properties to 
sufficient degrees.
15 This claim is consistent with what Hare (2013) calls Personal Essence Is Not Perfectly Fragile.
16 E.g., Parfit (1984) and the many philosophers influenced by his views on personal identity.
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3.  Death and Deprivation
Recall Jane’s death. She is struck by a bus and dies instantly; if she had not died 
when she did, she would have had another 80 years of good life. Jane’s death 
could have a positive or negative impact on others. Her failing students could, 
rather callously, be relieved by her death. Her children could grieve her death. 
But suppose none of this is the case; assume instead that Jane’s death is neutral 
for everyone else. Then, whether Jane’s death is worse seems to depend on its 
positive or negative impact for her, particularly, whether it is better or worse 
for her. According to
Weak Deprivationism: One thing that makes death worse (better) for the 
particular person who dies is that it deprives this person of good (bad) 
life she otherwise would have had.17 Even in the absence of other factors 
(e.g., desire frustration), death can be worse for the particular person 
who dies, in virtue of deprivation of good life.18
Thus, even supposing that (for whatever reason) Jane presently lacks the desire 
for continued existence and would not be very psychologically connected to 
her future self,19 her death is worse for her given that it deprives her of 80 years 
of good life. Weak Deprivationism seems a plausible view, but I will not defend 
it here. As a supplement to Weak Deprivationism, I will assume
Unbounded Worseness: The worseness of death for the particular person 
who dies has no upper limit and can, other things equal, grow bound-
lessly as the amount of good life death deprives this person of grows 
boundlessly.
That is, other things equal, the degree to which Jane’s death is worse for her 
would have been greater if she were deprived of 180 years of good life rather 
than 80, and much greater if she were deprived of 1,080  years of good life 
rather than 80. As the amount of good life she is deprived of increases bound-
lessly, the degree to which her death is worse for her would increase without 
approaching any upper limit. Many find Unbounded Worseness plausible, 
though it is more controversial than Weak Deprivationism.20
17 See Nagel (1970), Bradley (2009), Kagan (2012), and Solberg ( chapter 6, this volume).
18 There are some radical views according to which the worseness of death for the particular person 
who dies depends only on certain desires at the time of death; these views are incompatible with Weak 
Deprivationism. But as Timmerman (2016) argues, these radical views face serious difficulties.
19 On the importance of psychological connectedness, see McMahan (2002;  chapter 8, this volume).
20 Williams (1978) and Kagan (2012) can be read as skeptics about Unbounded Worseness. I argue 
for Unbounded Worseness in Pummer (unpublished manuscript).
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4.  The Fine Line Between Death and Nonexistence
I am now in a position to present my argument for Comparativism. Compare 
the following two scenarios, which differ only in the particular ways 
specified here:
Death: In possible state of affairs (A), thing x is around for just a second 
and is destroyed at t0. For this second, thing x meets all the conditions 
on being a person, and just barely has a sufficient degree of property P.21 
In possible state of affairs (B), things are exactly as they are in (A), except 
that at and after t0 this x, which is a person, call her Lucy, has plenty more 
than the sufficient degree of property P and has 80 years of good life, 
dying at t80. (A) is actual. All other things are equal.
Nonexistence: In possible state of affairs (C), thing x is around for just a 
second and is destroyed at t0. For this second, thing x meets all the other 
conditions on being a person, but just barely fails to have a sufficient 
degree of property P, and so is not a person. If this x had slightly more 
P, then a person, call her Lucy, would exist. In possible state of affairs 
(D), things are exactly as they are in (C), except that at and after t0 this 
x which becomes a person, call her Lucy, has plenty more than the suf-
ficient degree of property P and has 80 years of good life, dying at t80. 
(C) is actual. All other things are equal.
The diagrams (not to scale) in figure 15.1 illustrate these two scenarios; the dot-
ted line represents the degree of property P that would be sufficient.
According to Weak Deprivationism, the Death scenario involves worseness for 
Lucy, given that (A) is actual and (B) is possible. Lucy is deprived of 80 years of good 
life. According to Non- Comparativism, it is not the case that the Nonexistence 
scenario involves worseness for Lucy, given that (C) is actual and (D) is possible. 
Lucy does not exist in (C), so this cannot be worse for her than (D).
Nonetheless, according to Fragility of Existence, the nonevaluative difference 
between the Death scenario and the Nonexistence scenario is slight. Moreover, 
we can modify (B) and (D) by making the amount of good life had by Lucy 
arbitrarily large: 180 years, 1,080 years, and so on. According to Unbounded 
Worseness, we can thereby make the amount of worseness for Lucy in the Death 
scenario arbitrarily large; of course, according to Non- Comparativism, there 
would remain no worseness for Lucy in the Nonexistence scenario. Fragility 
of Existence, Unbounded Worseness, and Non- Comparativism together entail
21 Perhaps one second is not enough for x to meet  all these conditions, but the example can be 
modified accordingly.
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Hypersensitivity:  The evaluative difference between Death and 
Nonexistence can be arbitrarily large, while the nonevaluative difference 
between these two scenarios is slight.
But Hypersensitivity seems implausible. Though several people do, not every-
one shares my intuition that this form of hypersensitivity of the evaluative to 
the nonevaluative is implausible. The purpose of this chapter is not to per-
suade those who do not find Hypersensitivity implausible, but more to explore 
where consistent Hypersensitivity avoidance might lead us.22
The rejection of Hypersensitivity entails that we must reject Fragility of 
Existence, or Unbounded Worseness, or Non- Comparativism. Thus given 
Fragility of Existence and Unbounded Worseness, we must reject Non- 
Comparativism. In particular, we must claim that the Nonexistence scenario 
involves worseness for Lucy, despite the fact that she exists in only one of the 
two possible states of affairs compared. So we must embrace Comparativism.
5.  Indeterminacy
Recall that, setting aside indeterminacy, Reductionism and Gradability 
together support Fragility of Existence. Although it is useful to explore things 








t0 t80 t0 t80
t0 t80 t0 t80
FIGURE 15.1. Death versus Nonexistence.
22 I discuss Hypersensitivity in somewhat greater depth in Pummer (unpublished manuscript).
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initially while setting aside indeterminacy, it should be noted that it is natu-
ral for someone who accepts Reductionism and Gradability not to “set aside” 
indeterminacy, and to instead claim that it is often indeterminate whether a 
thing x is a person.23 Note that it is metaphysical rather than epistemic indeter-
minacy that is of interest here.24 It is facts about whether x is a person, noth-
ing to do with our concepts or awareness, which enable the argument in the 
preceding section.
If we accept Reductionism and Gradability, then we may believe that a 
slight difference in the degree to which property P is possessed could not make 
the difference between x determinately being a person and x determinately 
not being a person. Suppose we start from a case in which x possesses enough 
P such that it is determinate that it is a person, and consider a series of cases 
each in which x possesses slightly less and less P until we reach a case in which 
x possesses so little P that it is determinate that it is not a person. For a range 
of cases in the middle of the series it is indeterminate whether x is a person.
Consistent with these claims, it is a plausible view about the metaphysics of 
indeterminacy that at least some differences in the degree to which property 
P is possessed make it indeterminate whether the difference between being a 
person and not is made (or at least make it indeterminate whether it is indeter-
minate whether the difference between being a person and not is made, etc.). 
For if each slight difference in the degree to which property P is possessed 
determinately made no difference to whether x is a person, we would be forced 
to accept the conclusion that x is a person when it is not.
The upshot of this is that if we bring indeterminacy into the picture, 
Reductionism and Gradability need not entail Fragility of Existence. But they 
would still entail an indeterminate analogue of Fragility of Existence, namely 
that in some cases slight differences in the degree to which property P is pos-
sessed by x can make it indeterminate whether x is a person (there are further 
analogues for higher- order indeterminacy, which I will not discuss here). We 
can call this claim Indeterminate Fragility of Existence.
Recall that Fragility of Existence implies that the nonevaluative difference 
between the possible state of affairs in which x is a person and the possible state 
of affairs in which x is not a person can be slight. Coupled with Unbounded 
Worseness and Non- Comparativism, Fragility of Existence implies that 
slight nonevaluative differences can make arbitrarily large evaluative differ-
ences (Hypersensitivity). Now suppose we replace Fragility of Existence with 
Indeterminate Fragility of Existence. Coupled with Unbounded Worseness 
and Non- Comparativism, Indeterminate Fragility of Existence implies
23 See, e.g., Parfit (1984).
24 See Barnes (2014).
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Indeterminate Hypersensitivity: It can be indeterminate whether the eval-
uative difference between Death and Nonexistence is arbitrarily large, 
while the nonevaluative difference between these two scenarios is slight.
But Indeterminate Hypersensitivity seems roughly as implausible as 
Hypersensitivity. Unbounded Worseness, Indeterminate Fragility of Existence, 
and avoidance of Indeterminate Hypersensitivity together pressure us to reject 
Non- Comparativism. Thus the argument for Comparativism stands.
I will now very briefly flag three possible replies. The first reply is that my 
argument against Non- Comparativism is structurally analogous to a sorites 
argument.25 Even if it were, I  believe evaluative sorites arguments are often 
substantively disanalogous in an important way to standard sorites argu-
ments.26 The second reply construes indeterminacy as a matter of degree and 
argues that the evaluative difference between different possible states of affairs 
and scenarios smoothly tracks differences in the relevant degrees of indeter-
minacy. That is, we could claim that the degree to which it is indeterminate 
whether x is a person is in part a function of the degree to which x possesses 
property P and that evaluative differences ultimately track these differences 
in degree. This would presumably enable (Indeterminate) Hypersensitivity 
avoidance. Though it has some advantages, this is a controversial way of 
thinking about indeterminacy and its evaluative significance.27 The third pos-
sible reply avoids invoking indeterminacy (and so avoids invoking degrees of 
indeterminacy), but retains the second reply’s claim that evaluative differences 
track differences in the degree to which x possesses P. This reply implies that 
there is some degree of worseness for Lucy in the Nonexistence scenario. Thus, 
however plausible it is in its own right, it is not a reply that could come to the 
aid of Non- Comparativism. Moreover, as I argue elsewhere, there is an inde-
pendent reason to be skeptical that the last two replies will yield independently 
satisfactory solutions.28
6.  Back to Metaphysics
I have argued that the conjunction of (Indeterminate) Fragility of Existence, 
Unbounded Worseness, and avoidance of (Indeterminate) Hypersensitivity 
pressures us to reject Non- Comparativism and to accept that a possible state of 
affairs in which Lucy never exists is worse for her than a possible state of affairs 
25 See Hyde (2014) and Goodenough (1996).
26 Pummer (unpublished manuscript).
27 For discussions of indeterminacy in ethics, see Wasserman (2012), Williams (2013, 2014), and 
Dunaway (2016).
28 Pummer (unpublished manuscript).
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in which she exists with many years of good life (i.e., to accept Comparativism). 
But most defenders of Non- Comparativism believe their view is true on logi-
cal grounds, finding denials of their view to be incoherent. Indeed, most accept 
the following short argument from Broome: “[I] f [Lucy] had never lived at all, 
there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been 
worse for her.”29
In response, several authors have conceded that, while Nonexistence is not 
worse for Lucy, it would have been good for Lucy to exist with good life.30 But 
insofar as defenders of Person- Affecting Views are (at a minimum) committed 
to the thought that there is some special significance for the betterness (worse-
ness) of possible states of affairs, of their being better (worse) for particular 
people, possible states of affairs being good (bad) for particular people may 
not be good enough. That is, these noncomparative notions (“good for” and 
“bad for”) will at least play a different, and presumably less weighty, role than 
comparative notions (“better for” and “worse for”) according to defenders of 
Person- Affecting Views.
Nonconcessive responses are available to Comparativists. First, we might 
reject the orthodox semantics for sentences like “(C) is worse for Lucy than 
(D)” that is assumed by Non- Comparativists. According to this orthodox 
semantics, the truth of “(C) is worse for Lucy than (D)” requires that the per-
son Lucy exists. We might instead take “Lucy” in such sentences to refer not 
to a person but to a richly described life. In (C), the possible state of affairs in 
which the person Lucy does not exist (which is actual), we can take “Lucy” to 
refer to the “null life,” and we can then say that this is worse than the life lived 
in (D).31
I am attracted to an alternative nonconcessive response that adopts a revi-
sionary metaphysics while retaining the orthodox semantics. According to this 
revisionary metaphysics, the person Lucy exists in the actual state of affairs 
(C) as a merely possible person; she exists here, though she does not live a con-
crete life.32 The Comparativist could then reply to Broome that even though 
29 The fuller quote (from Broome 1999, 168): “[I] t cannot ever be true that it is better for a person that 
she lives than that she should never have lived at all. If it were better for a person that she lives than that 
she should never have lived at all, then if she had never had lived at all, that would have been worse for 
her than if she had lived. But if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse 
for, so it could not have been worse for her.” Some authors (Holtug 2001; Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 
2015) reject the conditional in Broome’s second sentence and accept Limited Comparativism, according 
to which it can be better (worse) for a person to live than never live at all, if she exists in the actual state 
of affairs, but cannot be better (worse) for a person to live than never live at all, if she does not exist in 
the actual state of affairs. This is an intriguing proposal, but it is worth noting that my argument against 
Non- Comparativism is also an argument against Limited Comparativism, as my argument implies that 
(C) is worse for Lucy than (D), even though (C) is actual and Lucy does not exist in (C).
30 E.g., Bykvist (2007); McMahan (2013).
31 Cusbert and Greaves (2016) are developing an account along these lines.
32 As Cusbert and Greaves (2016) note, there are a number of particular metaphysical views that 
would supply the Comparativist with the sort of revisionary metaphysics she needs. One example is 
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Lucy lived no concrete life at all in (C), there nonetheless is a “her” for (C) to 
be worse for than (D). Of course, adopting this line would force us to refor-
mulate Comparativism and much of the previous discussion, replacing “exists” 
with “lives a concrete life” and so on.
Some might offer incredulous stares at the suggestion that things can be 
better or worse for merely possible persons, even if they exist. These stares 
seem misplaced; it was orthodox metaphysics that prevented us from saying 
(C) is worse for Lucy than (D), in implying there is no Lucy in (C). But we’ve 
just rejected orthodox metaphysics. It is true that “Lucy” here refers only to a 
merely possible person, but I do not see why we cannot say things can be better 
or worse for merely possible persons.33 I suspect any persisting intuitions that 
we cannot are symptoms of continuing to assume, with orthodox metaphys-
ics, that merely possible people do not exist. Perhaps the incredulous stares 
are better aimed at the revisionary metaphysics itself, which is indeed at odds 
with common sense. But there are powerful independent theoretical reasons 
for adopting the revisionary metaphysics, and it seems open to Comparativists 
to argue that the independent plausibility of Comparativism provides a further 
reason for adopting it.
I lack the space here to fully articulate, much less adequately defend, the 
nonconcessive responses sketched above. But I  hope that the independent 
advantages of Comparativism (particularly those I  have highlighted in this 
chapter) at least suggest there is good reason to explore them further.
Progress in ethics and metaphysics bears on whether (and if so, to what 
extent) we should give priority to independently existing persons over merely 
possible persons, which in turn bears on monumentally important practical 
questions that occur in a variety of contexts, including procreation, resource 
conservation, climate change, and public health. In this chapter I have shown 
one way in which such progress might unfold.
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